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RACIAL PROFILING IN JURY SELECTION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
REVISITS THE BATSON INQUIRY IN RILEY v. TAYLOR
I. INTRODUCTION
A disturbing reality of the American judicial system is the role race
plays in the criminal system, particularly in the use of peremptory chal-
lenges.1 The American legal system has long depended on peremptory
challenges, a tool that allows the attorney to remove a juror for no articu-
lated reason, in order to obtain an impartial jury.2 Problems arise, how-
ever, when attorneys abuse the use of peremptory challenges.3 One
specific form of abuse is the striking of African-American jurors from the
1. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (discussing influence of race
in voir dire and jury selection). The Supreme Court was very candid in its admis-
sion of the existence of racial discrimination in the trial process. See id. (recogniz-
ing that peremptory challenges have, at times, been used to discriminate against
African-American jurors). See generally SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUS-
TICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (2000) (discussing effect of race of
both defendant and victim during criminal trials and sentencings). The Batson
Court made a distinction between the use of peremptory challenges in theory and
in practice, noting that despite theoretical ideals, state and federal court opinions
demonstrate that peremptory challenges have been used to discriminate against
African-Americanjurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 (analyzing practical realities of trial
practice). Studies have shown evidence that race impacts several phases of the
criminal process including charging, sentencing and capital punishment, with mi-
norities receiving harsher treatment in most stages. See WALKER ET AL., supra, at
242 (overviewing study results); see also CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, RACE AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: How RACE AFFECTS JURY TRIALS, 38 (1996) (discuss-
ing widely held belief among attorneys that "the racial composition of a jury can
affect the outcome of a trial").
2. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (discussing historical importance of peremptory
challenges free ofjudicial control in "assuring the selection of a qualified and un-
biased jury"); see also Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Criminal Law: Racism, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1988) (emphasizing traditional significance of peremptory
challenge in American history by describing it as "[a] venerable institution" and
"[a] time-honored prosecutorial libert[y]"). The peremptory challenge is a highly
protected prosecutorial tool. See Serr & Maney, supra, at 11 ("Because of the his-
torical credentials of peremptory challenges and the widespread belief that the
strikes are a necessary aspect of trial by jury, their exercise is considered one of the
accused's most important rights."). The peremptory challenge allows the attorney
to strike jurors for most any reason including inattentiveness, poor attitude, bore-
dom and indifference. See TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION:
STRATEGY AND SCIENCE, § 23:2, 23-11 (2000) (describing cases in which courts per-
mit peremptory challenges on seemingly irrelevant reasons). Attorneys are in-
structed to follow their "instincts" and "hunches" when exercising their
peremptory strikes. See id. § 23-11, 23-12 (finding that courts allow peremptory
challenges based on attorney's inclinations).
3. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring) (encouraging judicial
inquiry into potential abuses of peremptory strikes by attorneys). Justice White
stated in concurrence, "[T]he practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from
(1195)
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jury pool, solely because of their race. 4 The Supreme Court has ruled that
such race-based strikes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitu-
tion.5 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court noted the egregiousness of
racially-motivated peremptory strikes, and moved to remedy the problem. 6
Batson v. Kentucky7 is the most recognized of these cases. 8
In Batson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant, using only the
facts in his case, could successfully challenge a prosecutor's discriminatory
use of peremptory strikes.9 In addition, the Court established the Batson
three-part test.' 0 First, a defendant must prove a prima facie case of dis-
crimination by the prosecutor." Second, the prosecutor must disprove
this accusation by providing race-neutral reasons for striking the African-
American juror(s) in question. 12 Third, the trial court must assess the
facial validity of the prosecutor's reasons, and decide, based on evidence
petit juries in cases with black defendants remains widespread, so much so that I
agree that an opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this occurs." Id.
4. See id. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring) (indicating peremptory challenges
as "more subtle way[ ] of keeping blacks off jury venires"); Jeffrey S. Brand, The
Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994
Wis. L. REv. 511, 598 (supporting proposition that "'[m] isuse of the peremptory
challenge to exclude blacks has become both common and flagrant."' (quoting
Batson, 476 U.S. at 103)).
5. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222-24 (1965) (holding that states must
abide by equal protection clause when making peremptory strikes), overruled by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6. See id. at 224-28 (holding that it is impermissible for states to exercise their
peremptory challenge in racially discriminatory manner). Swain is most noted for
establishing the evidentiary burden of systematic discrimination. See id. at 222-23
(noting that there is presumption that prosecutor uses challenges to obtain fair
and impartial juries). This burden required the defendant to prove a practice of
systematic discrimination against black jurors using evidence obtained from a se-
ries of cases. See id. at 225-27 (holding that declarant had not met his burden of
proof); see also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935) (holding that Equal
Protection Clause is violated when minority members are excluded from jury
based on assumption that they are not qualified to serve as jurors); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that state violates Equal Protec-
tion clause when it purposefully excludes minorities from jury).
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8. See Brand, supra note 4, at 522 (noting that in Batson, Supreme Court de-
fines current standards for dealing with racially motivated peremptory challenges).
"The Court's opinion in Batson established the tone and framework for the [per-
emptory challenge] decisions which would follow." Id. at 575.
9. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (reasserting Supreme Court's position that "a
defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in
selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his
case").
10. See id. at 96-99 (setting forth Batson test elements).
11. See id. at 96 (pointing out prima facie discrimination element that defen-
dant must establish for successful Batson claim).
12. See id. at 97 (explaining that burden shifts to prosecutor to prove that
challenges were not racially motivated).
1196
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from the case at hand, if there has been an unconstitutional use of per-
emptory strikes. 1
3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently re-
viewed the application of Batson at the trial court level in Riley v. Taylor.14
This Casebrief tracks the Third Circuit's application of the Batson test over
several years, concluding with an analysis of how these decisions influ-
enced Riley. 15 Part II discusses the goals, scope and limitations of the Bat-
son test.16 Part II also assesses other circuits' interpretation of the Batson
test, and how the limitations of Batson affect the test's purported goals.
17
Part III closely analyzes the Third Circuit's application of Batson by review-
ing its most recent decision in Riley.18 Furthermore, Part III contemplates
Riley's outcome in light of the more restrictive appellate review standards
recently adopted by Congress. 19 Finally, Part IV discusses the overall im-
pact of Batson in the Third Circuit despite its limitations. 20
II. BACKGROUND: THE SUPREME COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT AND
APPLICATION OF THE BATSON TEST
The exclusion of African-Americans from participation in mainstream
political and community events in the 1960s is Well documented. 21 Al-
13. See id. at 96-99 (discussing trial court's discretionary role in determining
whether defendant has made prima facie case of discrimination and whether pros-
ecutor has satisfied race-neutral explanation requirement).
14. 277 F.3d 261, 273-94 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing petitioner's claim that
state's peremptory challenges violated Equal Protection clause).
15. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's Batson application, see infra
notes 87-146 and accompanying text.
16. For further discussion of the goals, scope and limitations of Batson test,
see infra notes 21-86 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion of how circuit courts apply the Batson test, see infra
notes 40-86 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion of the way the Third Circuit applies the Batson test,
see infra notes 86-146 and accompanying text.
19. For comparison of Third Circuit application of the Batson test with appli-
cation of newly adopted Congressional standards under Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act, see infra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
20. For further discussion of Batson's impact on racial strikes in the criminal
system, see infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
21. See Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister?
Race-neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 327, 334 (1994)
(discussing how poll taxes and subjective registration were intended to keep Afri-
can-Americans from participating in political systems); see also Richard Saks, Note,
Redemption Or Exemption?: Racial Discrimination in Judicial Elections Under the Voting
Rights Act, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 245, 245 (1990) (acknowledging various proce-
dures implemented to disenfranchise African-American voters). After the Voter's
Rights Act was enacted, voting-rights activists hoped to end discriminatory prac-
tices such as poll taxes and literacy requirements that had traditionally disen-
franchised Afican-American voters. See id. (noting methods used to
disenfranchise African-American voters). Furthermore, African-Americans have
historically been barred from participating in business transactions. See Robert E.
Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1261-62
(1991) (noting discriminatory history against African-Americans attempting to par-
3
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though the Supreme Court and Congress attempted, through various re-
forms, to equalize the status of African-American citizens in American
society, their efforts fell short of actual application, instead being rele-
gated to theoretical words on paper.22 This phenomenon was particularly
apparent in the trial court system. 23 Although the trial system was suppos-
edly "a level playing field, fully capable of operating to insure a fair
trial[,] "24 African-Americans were routinely excluded from participating
in both the jury pool and subsequently seated jury through various means,
including the peremptory challenge. 25 The Supreme Court responded to
ticipate in business opportunities). In addition to limits on business activity, cer-
tain state legislation also limited community participation: 'Jim Crow legislation
circumscribed the general social and legal rights of blacks." Id.
22. See Serr & Maney, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining difficulty in implementing
successful protections against discrimination due to "subtle and often uncon-
scious" nature of racism); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Juy, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1611, 1615 (1985) (asserting failure of Equal Protection Clause in
"ferreting out racial discrimination in criminal trials").
23. SeeJones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 968 (1993) (conceding that historically
"blacks and other minorities are the usual victims of the stigmatization that accom-
panies being excluded in open court on the assumption that their race makes
them uniquely incapable of being, fair and impartial."); see also WALKER ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 157 (noting, "[s]ince the mid-1930s, the Supreme Court has made
it increasingly difficult for court systems to exclude African-Americans or Hispanics
from the jury pool."). Although the Supreme Court's decisions often support anti-
discrimination practices and legislation, it is difficult to enforce these decisions in
state and local courtrooms. See id. at 156 (explaining failure of Supreme Court
anti-discrimination decisions to change practice within many jurisdictions); see also
Coke, supra note 21, at 333-50 (arguing that Court's attempt will fail to increase
minority participation in criminal trial system).
24. Brand, supra note 4, at 566.
25. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J., concurring)
(citing peremptory challenges as widely used means of keeping African-Americans
from serving as jurors on cases involving African-American defendants). For dis-
cussion of further means, besides peremptory challenges, used to exclude African-
Americans from jury service, see WALKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 156. After realiz-
ing that legislatures could not constitutionally exclude African-Americans from the
jury pool, courts found more inventive ways to keep African-Americans from serv-
ing. See id. (noting that southern states often tried to prevent African-Americans
from serving). One system used to prevent African-Americans from sitting on ju-
ries was to select a list of "sober and judicious" citizens from the jurisdiction's tax-
payer list. See id. (explaining Delaware jurisdiction's attempt to circumvent
Supreme Court). This practice was soon found unconstitutional because jurisdic-
tions were using it to exclude potential African-American jurors because "few...
were intelligent, experienced, or moral enough to serve asjurors." Id. Other com-
mon practices used by various jurisdictions included putting jurors names on dif-
ferent colored cards according to race, and "randomly" drawing the cards to
obtain a seated jury; "random" selection of names from taxbooks in which names
of citizens were categorized according to race; and including "a token number of
racial minorities in the jury pool in an attempt to head off charges of racial dis-
crimination." Id. at 157 (describing racially motivated techniques American juris-
dictions used in jury selection). Despite the gains the Supreme Court
accomplished, racially influenced means are still being used today to prevent Afri-
can-Americans from sitting on juries. See id. (describing continued practice of ra-
cially-motivated techniques).
1198 [Vol. 47: p. 1195
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this problem in Batson by allowing the defendant to use the circumstances
and the evidence from his individual case to prove discrimination in jury
selection.2 6
A. The Batson Case
In Batson, an African-American man was on trial for second-degree
burglary and receipt of stolen goods.2 7 During the trial, the prosecutor
used his peremptory challenges to strike every black juror from the jury
pool, resulting in the seating of an all-white jury.28 Although the defense
counsel objected to these challenges, the trial judge dismissed the objec-
tion, stating that prosecutors could "strike anybody they want to."29 The
defendant was subsequently convicted of the charges. 30 In reviewing the
case, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and introduced a
method that allowed a defendant to successfully challenge a prosecutor's
discriminatory use of peremptory strikes using only the facts in the defen-
dant's case.31
The Court held that in order to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, a defendant must show: (1) he is a member of a cognizable
racial group; and (2) the prosecutor has struck members of that racial
group from the jury venire. 32 A prima facie showing gives the defendant,
as a matter of course, a presumption that the peremptory strike permits
26. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (holding that defendants may use facts and cir-
cumstances of their own case to establish inference of discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges). Previous to the Batson holding, Swain v. Alabama was the
reigning precedent on discriminatory peremptory challenges. See generally 380 U.S.
202 (1965) (demonstrating that twenty-two years passed before Batson overruled
Swain), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Swain, the defen-
dant was convicted of rape by an all white jury, and sentenced to death. See 380
U.S. at 203 (describing facts of case). The defendant attempted to prove that the
jury selection was undermined by invidious discrimination. See id. (same). The
defendant's appeal was denied, and the Court held that "the defendant must...
show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against Negroes
over a period of time." Id. at 227. The Supreme Court later admitted that the
evidentiary burden in Swain was too difficult for defendants to meet, and thus
rendered no real impact on discriminatory peremptory challenge use. See Batson,
476 U.S. at 92 (recognizing inherent difficulty in proving repeated striking of Afri-
can-American jurors over numerous cases required to prevail under Swain).
"Since this interpretation of Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden of
proof, prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitu-
tional scrutiny." Id. at 92-93.
27. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 (articulating facts of case).
28. See id. at 83.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 95 (holding that defendant may make purposeful discrimination
showing using only circumstances from his present case).
32. See id. at 96-98 (announcing requirements necessary for prima facie show-
ing of purposeful discrimination).
2002] CASEBRIEF 1199
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the prosecutor to discriminate if he so desires. 33 Additionally, the defen-
dant must show, using the circumstances surrounding his case, that the
prosecutor's decision to use peremptory strikes in the selected manner was
based on race.
34
Next, the trial court must determine if the defendant has satisfied his
prima facie burden of showing discrimination. 35 If the trial court finds
the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the
state to present a neutral explanation for striking black jurors.3 6 The
Court, to preserve the revered tradition of the peremptory challenge, held
that the prosecutor's explanation does not have to rise to the level justify-
ing a challenge for cause. 3 7 Ultimately, the trial court must determine
whether the state is, in fact, purposefully discriminating against African-
American jurors. 38 In deciding Batson, the Court promoted several impor-
tant social policies, including, most importantly, the need for an Equal
Protection Clause that is an effective tool in both words and application.
39
B. Limits of Batson Application
Although groundbreaking at the time, Batson does not seem to be the
powerful tool it first appeared to be.40 The impact of Batson has waned at
33. See id. at 96 (discussing presumption granted defendant due to discre-
tionary nature of peremptory challenges).
34. See id. (acknowledging defendant's final element required to prove prima
facie case of discrimination).
35. See id. at 96-97 (asserting that trial court should consider all relevant cir-
cumstances when determining whether defendant has made prima facie showing
of purposeful discrimination).
36. See id. at 97 (announcing second prong of test).
37. See id. at 97 (acknowledging and addressing possible limitations on full
peremptory nature of challenges).
38. See id. at 98 (establishing third prong of test, Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has estab-
lished purposeful discrimination.").
39. See id. at 86-87 (realizing harm inflicted by discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges). First, the Court emphasized that discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges violates the defendant's right to equal protection because it denies
the fair trial that can only be afforded him by a jury that is objectively chosen. See
id. (addressing potential disservices to defendant that Batson ruling was designed
to eliminate). Next, the Court set out to protect the equal protection rights of the
juror who is unjustly removed from the venire because of an incorrect assumption
that he/she will be unable to impartially consider the evidence solely because he/
she is of a particular race. See id. (acknowledging rights of jurors that Court at-
tempts to protect in implementing Batson holding). The Court stated, "A person's
race simply is unrelated to his fitness as a juror." Id. at 87 (internal quotes omit-
ted). Finally, the Court set out to protect the entire community from harm
brought about by equal protection violations because "[s] election procedures that
purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in
the fairness of our system of justice." Id.
40. See id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (expressing doubt as to usefulness
of Batson in combating practice of racial discrimination in jury selection).
1200
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss5/7
2002] CASEBRIEF 1201
the trial and appellate levels. 4 1 While Batson hearings often seem fairly
applied, the claims are usually unsuccessful. 42 Several reasons may be im-
peding the effectiveness of Batson, including the presumption of proper
discretionary use of the peremptory privilege by attorneys and blithe ac-
ceptance of doubtful race-neutral reasons by trial courts.
1. Presumption of Proper Use of Peremptory Strikes
The peremptory challenge is a historically established attorney privi-
lege that is purported to ensure fair trials. 43 Although not a constitution-
ally established right, it is given great accord and respect in the legal
community. 44 The Supreme Court, in Batson, was forced to cut into the
peremptory challenge privilege by requiring that attorneys give a reason
for their strike. 45 This requirement cut against the very nature of the per-
emptory challenge. 46 In trying to balance the attorney's established privi-
41. See Brand, supra note 4, at 584-88 (analyzing extremely low rate of success
of Batson claims in district and circuit courts); WALKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 161
(addressing continuing practice of using racially motivated peremptory strikes de-
spite Batson ruling). "Prosecutors continue to use the peremptory challenge to
exclude African-American jurors from cases with African-American defendants,
and appellate courts continue to rule that their racially neutral explanations ade-
quately meet the standards articulated in Batson." Id.
42. See Brand, supra note 4, at 586-88 (noting 5.6% success rate of Batson
claims in federal courts).
43. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965) (articulating importance
of peremptory challenges in jury selection), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
In light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it
serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury
trial .... [t]he presumption... must be that the prosecutor is using the
State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before
the court.
Id.; see also Serr & Maney, supra note 2, at 11 (noting historical nature of peremp-
tory challenge and pervasive belief that peremptory challenges are integral to
American criminal justice system).
44. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (analyzing importance of
peremptory challenge, despite lack of constitutional protection). "[P]eremptory
challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are
but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a
fair trial." Id.
45. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (holding that prosecutors must give racially neu-
tral reasons for peremptory challenges in certain cases). But see id. at 134-39 (Bur-
gerJ., dissenting) (criticizing Court's ruling as undercutting prosecutor's privilege
of peremptory challenges). For further discussion of the Batson case and its hold-
ing, see supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
46. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 222 (addressing inviolate nature of peremptory chal-
lenge: "[W]e cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the
prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case."); see also
Serr & Maney, supra note 2, at 17 (describing nature of peremptory strikes as
irrational and instinctual). In their article, authors Serr & Maney assert that the
very nature of peremptory challenges is to strike jurors without a rational basis. See
id. For further discussion of inviolate nature of peremptory challenge, see supra
notes 43-45 and accompanying text, and infra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
7
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lege against constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court held the
attorney's race-neutral reason to a very low threshold.4 7 Furthermore, the
Court afforded the attorney the presumption of proper use of the strike.48
Given this established presumption towards non-discrimination,
courts are more likely to accept an explanation when counsel inevitably
offers a "neutral" reason for striking ajuror.49 Consequently, courts have
found many reasons facially valid such as age, life experience, type of em-
ployment and demeanor.50 Other acceptable "neutral" reasons include: a
juror's low-income neighborhood; 51 ajuror's ability to speak a foreign Ian-
47. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (establishing level of reasoning prosecutor must
meet in refuting racial discrimination charge).
48. See id. at 99, n.2 (asserting Court's faith in prosecutors' legitimate use of
peremptory challenge); see also Johnson, supra note 23, at 1613 (criticizing Su-
preme Court's "lenient standard" regarding prosecution's race-neutral reason for
utilizing strike). "The Court has applied a fairly lenient standard for proof of dis-
crimination in the selection ofjury venires, but its insistence on nondiscriminatory
selection of the venire sharply contrasts with its laxity concerning the selection of
the panel that will try a particular defendant." Id. at 613-14.
49. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (criticizing Batson
protection as "illusory," in part because "[a] ny prosecutor can easily assert facially
neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-
guess those reasons"); United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1162 (3d Cir.
1989) (Higginbotham,J., concurring) (asserting that due to low standards applied
when judging race-neutral reasons, superficial reasons are constantly accepted as
valid). In his concurrence, Justice Higginbotham expressed his apprehensions
that "the principles enunciated in Batson are being undermined by excuses that
have all form and no substance." Id.; see also Brand, supra note 4, at 592 (criticizing
"federal judiciary's expansive definition and indiscriminate acceptance of 'race-
neutral reasons"'). The unquestioning acceptance of "[h]ighly subjective, vague
and unsubstantiated" reasons has been blamed for so few findings of Batson viola-
tions. See id. (highlighting shortcomings of Batson ruling).
50. SeeJordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2000) (listing examples of
several race-neutral reasons courts found acceptable in various cases).
51. See United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that prosecutor's race-neutral reason, that stricken juror lived in low-income
neighborhood and, thus, could be "involved with a drug situation where she lives,"
was acceptable) (citing trial transcript). In his dissent, Justice Pollak made the
point that striking jurors based on low-income living situations was suspect because
low-income "correlates closely with race[,]" and concluded that this correlation
results in the disproportionate representation of blacks in the jury. See id. at 400-01
(Pollack, J., dissenting) (quoting statistics that in northeast America "9.2% of
whites and 28.9% of blacks are below the poverty level").
8
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guage; 52 ajuror's habits and associations; 53 and the prosecutor's failure to
recognize a juror as African-American. 54 Although these reasons rarely
relate to a juror's ability to judge the case impartially, with some being
candidly referred to as "patently absurd," the courts have found them all
acceptable. 55
Taking into account the varied range of acceptable reasons, courts
should be alert to a prosecutor's use of neutral reasons as a pretext for
52. See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 858-62 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing
facts of case). In Pemberthy, the court found that the state did not violate Batson,
although it struck six Spanish-speaking jurors who would be able to translate a
highly contested tape recorded in Spanish. See id. (detailing facts and holding of
case). The court acknowledged that allowing such language-based challenges
could negatively affect representation of minorities who speak the language. See id.
at 869 (emphasizing that holding should not be interpreted as allowing attorneys
to strike Latino jurors based on ethnicity). The court stated, however, "that an
equal protection violation cannot be established simply by showing that Latinos
are disproportionately affected by peremptory challenges of jurors who can speak
... Spanish." Id.
53. See Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 920 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding peremp-
tory challenge valid). In Coulter, the state used nine of its fourteen peremptory
challenges to strike potential African-American jurors during jury selection. See id.
at 914 (discussing state's use of peremptory challenges). The Seventh Circuit felt
the prosecutor's reason for striking a particular prospective juror-that his three
children were not by the same woman, and he was unemployed-seemed ridicu-
lous and a pretext. See id. The court did not find a Batson violation, however,
because the state's explanations did not have to be "persuasive, or even plausible,"
and substantial deference must be accorded to the trial court's findings. See id. at
920 (citations omitted) (discussing whether state's explanations are plausible).
The court stated that "[t]he presumption of correctness ... for state court fact
findings requires us to defer to the appellate court's acceptance at the individual
level of even the State's flimsier explanations .... Id.; see also United States v.
Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that it is permissible for prose-
cutor to strike jurors whose impartiality he questions due to their "habits and as-
sociations"). In Vaccaro, the prosecutor struck two African-American jurors
because one had a brother in prison, and the other had a "poor attitude." Id. at
457 (articulating reasons for striking prospective jurors). The court held that a
prospective juror's habits and associations were adequate reasons for using per-
emptory challenges. See id. (holding that prosecutor's reasons did not raise infer-
ence of discrimination).
54. See Clemmons, 892 F.2d at 1157 (holding that since prosecutor did not
know prospective juror was African-American, he did not engage in intentional
discrimination and Batson claim must fail). Although prosecutor did not recognize
potential juror as African-American, he recognized that he was a minority and
struck the juror based on the fear that this minority, whom he believed to be
Hindu, "may have religious beliefs that may affect his thinking." Id. at 1156. In his
concurrence, Judge Higginbotham commented on this view, stating that "[t]he
more disturbing aspect of the prosecutor's comments ... is his apparent suspicion
that because members of a particular ethnic group look different or have different
beliefs, they are not real 'Americans,' and thus cannot be trusted to serve as jurors
or to perform other duties of citizenship." Id. at 1160.
55. See Coulter, 155 F.3d at 920 (stating that reasons offered by state "seemed
to verge on the 'patently absurd"'); see also WALKER ET AL., "supra note 1, at 160
("Trial and appellate courts have also been willing to accept virtually any explana-
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discrimination. 56 Trial courts, however, are unwilling to investigate rea-
sons for pretext, and the record usually supports the facial validity of these
reasons. 5 7 The result, then, is that when parties are able to 'justify their
challenges on non-racial grounds, they can continue to use race-based ste-
reotypes as an unstated basis for peremptory challenges. Objecting parties
can only hope that the stated justification will explicitly mention race or
expose a racial bias. Otherwise, the justification likely will be accepted as
neutral. '58 Under these standards, it would seem that the Batson inquiry
works primarily when the discrimination is most obvious.5 9
This situation is exemplified in Harrison v. Ryan.60 In Harrison, the
Third Circuit found a Batson violation because the prosecutor, who had
56. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing difficulty of uncovering pretext because of possibility that prosecutor's
neutral reasons are driven by subconscious racism); see also Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at
872 (enumerating specific factors for courts to consider when investigating pretext
for language-based peremptory challenges). The Pemberthy court realized the ne-
cessity of inquiring into the attorney's pretext because language is closely related
to ethnicity. See id. (discussing heightened scrutiny needed in determining prose-
cutor's motive when language is offered as race-neutral reason).
57. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J. concurring) (discussing role trial
court judges have in applying Batson). Justice Marshall relates his fears that Batson
will prove to be an "illusory" protection, in part because "[a] judge's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well sup-
ported." Id.; see alsoJohnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (dis-
cussing rationale behind granting defendant's Batson claim because trial court
failed to investigate prosecutor's "neutral" reasons where prosecutor blatantly lied
about reasons for striking potential African-American juror). In some instances
judges feel that it is not their responsibility to question the prosecutor's peremp-
tory challenges at all. See Galarza v. Keane, 252 F.3d 630, 634 (2d Cir. 2001) (re-
manding due to judge's failure to make any determination at all); see also McClain
v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing judge's abdication of
responsibility where judge stated, "I'm not here to second guess [the prosecutor's]
reasons") (internal quotes omitted). Other judges have demonstrated that they
feel consideration of the Batson claim is a waste of the court's time. SeeJordan v.
Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 2000) (referring to judge's attitude that consid-
ering Batson challenge was unnecessary, untimely and not required).
58. Brand, supra note 4, at 584. Circuit courts often confirm this premise, as
did the Third Circuit in United States v. Uwaezhoke. See 995 F.2d 388, 392-93 (3d Cir.
1993) (reporting low prosecutorial standard that Supreme Court set for admitting
race-neutral reason). In Uwaezhoke, the court stated that "if the government's ex-
planation does not, on its face, discriminate on the basis of race, then we must find
that the explanation passes Batson .... Id. at 392.
59. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall,J., concurring) (discussing high bur-
den Batson establishes because "defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a
prima facie case"). Marshall insists that applying Batson will invite racial discrimi-
nation "provided that they [prosecutors] hold that discrimination to an 'accept-
able' level." Id.; see also Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that prosecutor failed to pass Batson requirement when, inter alia, he
failed to recall reason for striking African-American prospective juror).
60. 909 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 392 (adopting
Supreme Court's simplistic standard for attorneys when asserting that their reason
for striking was race-neutral).
10
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used a large number of strikes against African-Americans, forgot his rea-
son for striking the sixth juror.61 Although all factors were considered, his
failure to remember the reason for striking the sixth juror was the decid-
ing determinant. 62 The court held that failing to articulate a clear reason
for striking the juror constituted a failure to satisfy the Batson test prong
requiring parties to specify a neutral explanation. 63 This case illustrates
that Batson protection operates primarily where the inference of discrimi-
nation is obvious or unavoidable.
64
2. Cursory Review of Batson Claims by Trial Courts.
A second impediment to applying Batson effectively is the trial court's
cursory review of the attorney's use of peremptory challenges. It is the
trial judge's duty to determine whether the "circumstances surrounding
the peremptory challenges give rise to an inference of discrimination."
65
While the Supreme Court cited two examples of such a determination in
Batson, it largely left the decision to the hearingjudge as to how to fashion
this determination. 66 Because of the broad discretion the Supreme Court
affords, judges may utilize multiple sources of evidence and circumstances
61. See Harrison, 909 F.2d at 87-89 (discussing court's holding).
62. See id. at 87 (stating that "prosecutor's failure to recall his reason for using
a peremptory challenge to strike the juror was insufficient to satisfy the Batson
requirement")..
63. See id.
64. See id. at 86 n.2 (noting magistrate's finding that although prosecutor's
race-neutral reasons for striking several African-American jurors were not strong,
they were still satisfactory under Batson). For further discussion of success of weak
race-neutral.reasons, see supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
65. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (discussing trial court's
responsibility to determine likelihood of discrimination based on evidence and
circumstances of case); see also United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1155 (3d
Cir. 1989) (defining circumstances as "any unusual pattern of strikes or other sug-
gestive comments or acts by prosecutors").
66. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (articulating examples of relevant circum-
stances to consider in determining Batson violation). The Supreme Court related
circumstances such as habitual striking of African-Americans and the prosecutor's
questioning methods as examples. See id. at 97 (identifying relevant circumstances
for Batson violation). Other than these examples, the Supreme Court offered no
further guidance to determine whether Batson is violated, except to assert their
"confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to
decide if ... the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie
case of discrimination against black jurors." Id.
11
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to interpret this third prong.67 More often, however, their discretionary
finding is superficial and cursory. 68
The Third Circuit, following the Supreme Court, has expressed a gen-
uine belief that trial judges will recognize and correct discriminatory uses
of peremptory challenges. In Pemberthy v. Beyer,69 the court stated, "Nor do
we have any doubt that both the federal and state trialjudges in this circuit
will make a sincere and vigilant effort to prevent discrimination against...
[minority] jurors. '70 More recently, the court was forced to recognize that
not all trial and appellate court judges live up to this standard.7 ' In Riley,
67. S~e Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 281-87 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing Third
Circuit's various means used to examine prosecutor's race-neutral reasons). The
Third Circuit used several means of examining the prosecutor's race-neutral rea-
sons for pretext including comparison of stricken and seated jurors, referral to
prosecutor's briefs and review of trial transcripts. See id. (discussing trial court's
failure to use stated methods to determine racial pretext). Other circuits have also
employed the comparison method whereby it is determined whether any seated
white jurors have characteristics for which the prosecutor claims to have struck
blackjurors. SeeJordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing
Second Circuit's method of comparing seated white jurors to stricken black jurors
to determine whether characteristics were pretext for discrimination); McClain v.
Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing Ninth Circuit's method
of comparing characteristics of seated white jurors and stricken black jurors to
determine whether prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were pretext for discrimina-
tion). Another common method is circuit courts' examining transcripts and trial
records. See, e.g., United States v. Blanding, 250 F.3d 858, 859-60 (4th Cir. 2001)
(describing Fourth Circuit's examination of trial transcripts to determine whether
there were race-based reasons for peremptory challenges); United States v. Jones,
224 F.3d 621, 624-26 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing Seventh Circuit's use of trial tran-
scripts to determine improper reasons for peremptory challenges);Johnson v. Vas-
quez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing Ninth Circuit's examination of
voir dire transcript, evidentiary hearing transcript and prosecutor's jury panel sheet
to determine whether prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were pretext for
discrimination).
68. For further discussion of trial courts' insufficient investigation of Batson
claims, see infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
69. 19 F.3d 857 (3d Cir. 1994).
70. Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 872-73. In Pemberthy, the prosecutor used his peremp-
tory challenges to strike five Spanish-speaking jurors. See id. at 859-63 (reviewing
voir dire transcript). Both the trial and the appellate court found these strikes to be
race-neutral, even though three of the jurors were Latino. See id. at 858 (discussing
holding of trial). The court recognized that there is a close relationship between
foreign language-speaking ability and race. See id. at 869 (discussing relationship
between ethnicity and language). It asserted its faith in the courts, however, to
keep a watchful eye on prosecutors' true motive behind their use of peremptory
challenges to strike jurors based on their language ability. See id. at 872-73 (assert-
ing faith in trial court's ability to discern between pretext and valid strikes based
on language).
71. See Riley, 277 F.3d at 282-87 (finding that state court did not perform third
step of Batson).
Here, the state courts failed to examine all of the evidence to determine
whether the State's proffered race-neutral explanations were pretextual.
Not only is there no indication on the record that the hearing judge en-
gaged in the required analysis, but there is no indication that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court did so ....
1206 [Vol. 47: p. 1195
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the Third Circuit's most recent Batson case, the defendant raised his Bat-
son claim in six state and appellate trials before the circuit court granted
him a writ of habeas corpus.72 The Third Circuit's decision to reverse the
previous courts' rulings was primarily based on the lack of careful review
of the prosecutor's neutral reasons, the circumstances contained in the
case and evidence of systematic discrimination by the lower courts.
73
Other circuits similarly require trial courts to conduct a more probing
inquiry into Batson claims. For example, the Second Circuit has expressed
disapproval of courts' acting on "a Batson application with undue haste
and ruling in a summary fashion." 74 The Second Circuit imparts upon the
hearing judge a duty "at the third stage to determine the credibility of the
proffered explanations." 75 The Ninth Circuit allows the hearing judge to
"second-guess" the prosecuting attorney.76 The Seventh Circuit empha-
sizes the importance of a "final look at the record as a whole," instead of
the trial judge's 'juror-by-juror inquiry that. . ..practically guaranteed the
Id. at 286 (citing Sumner v. Mara, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981)).
72. See id. at 270-73 (discussing procedural history of defendant's case). Rais-
ing the Batson violation claim in the original trial allowed Riley to address the issue
on direct appeal, nevertheless the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convic-
tion. See id. at 271-72 (detailing Riley's first review of Batson issue). Riley then filed
a motion for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel in
Kent County Superior Court before his original trial judge, but the motion was
denied. See id. at 272 (outlining procedural history of case). In short, Riley's case
was reviewed and his conviction affirmed approximately six times, before the trial
record and circumstances of the case were reviewed and found to violate Batson.
See id. at 270-73 (discussing procedural history of case).
73. For further discussion of the Third Circuit Court's analysis of the Riley
case, see infra notes 94-154 and accompanying text.
74. SeeJordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2000) (pointing to disap-
proval of trial court's actions in United States v. Stavrovlakis, 952 F. 2d 686, 696 (2d
Cir. 1992)).
75. Id. at 200 (emphasis added) (citing Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150 (2d
Cir. 1999)). In Jordan, the defendant raised a Batson claim because the prosecutor
used his peremptory challenges to strike three African-American prospective ju-
rors. See id. at 199 (discussing facts ofjury selection). Without examining them for
pretext, the trial court judge hurriedly ruled that the reasons were race-neutral.
See id. (discussing judge's ruling on Batson claim). The Second Circuit held that
the trial court judge failed to perform the third Batson step because of his haste
and, therefore, did not adequately consider "whether the race-neutral reasons
given were credible and nonpretextual." Id. at 201.
76. See McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that
trial court failed to perform third prong of Batson test by refusing to "sec-
ond-guess" prosecutor). In McClain, the defendant raised a Batson violation claim
because the prosecutor used challenges to strike all three potential black jurors in
thejury pool. See id. at 1214 (outlining facts pertaining to jury selection). The trial
court refused to investigate the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons, and found that
Batson was not violated. See id. at 1223 (rejecting judge's ruling on Batson claim).
The Ninth Circuit court reversed the trial court's ruling, concluding that "the trial
court abdicated its duty to make an ultimate determination on the issue of discrim-
inatory intent based on all the facts and circumstances." Id.
13
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conclusion that the prosecution was acting race neutrally."7 7 As many
commentators note, a court's lax inquiry into the prosecutor's reasons is
largely influenced by the presumption that the prosecutor's use of per-
emptory challenges was correct and non-discriminatory. 78
Given trial courts' tendency to conduct a cursory examination of most
Batson claims, enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) was a sincere cause for concern among opponents. 79 Before the
AEDPA was enacted, appellate courts possessed plenary review over ques-
tions of law and mixed questions of law and fact.8 0 Under the AEDPA, an
appellate court can now intervene only when the trial court has commit-
ted a "Clear error" or an "unreasonable application" of the' circumstances
of the case to the applicable law.8 1 Implementing the AEDPA significantly
77. Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1998). In Coulter; the de-
fendant raised a Batson claim because the prosecutor used nine of his fourteen
peremptory strikes to strike prospective African-American jurors. See id. at 914
(noting prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes). The trial court required both the
defense and state to give reasons as each peremptory challenge was exercised. See
id. at 915 (discussing trial court voir dire method). Using this method, the trial
judge found that the defendant had not established a prima facie case and that the
prosecutor had already offered race-neutral reasons for his challenges. See id. at
916 (summarizing judge's ruling on Batson claim). The Seventh Circuit criticized
the trial court's method, stating that "a procedure that omits the totality inquiry
would exonerate the user of peremptories in virtually every case, unless the lawyer
was foolish enough to announce her discriminatory purpose in so many words."
Id. at 921.
78. See WALKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 160 (noting judges' tendency to "'give
the benefit of the doubt to the prosecutor"' (quoting RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAw 211 (1997)); Samuel Sommers & Phoebe Ellsworth, Juy Deci-
sion Making: White Juror Bias: An investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in
the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 201, 207 (2001) ("[1]n the wake
of Batson, today's judges continue to give prosecutors the benefit of the doubt
when they offer race-neutral justifications for the exclusion of Blacks from ju-
ries."); see also Barat S. McClain, Turner's Acceptance of Limited Voir Dire Renders Bat-
son's Equal Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 273, 300 (1989)
(noting that courts give prosecutor presumption of non-discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges when prosecutor may not be furnished with full data on jury
pool).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1994) (setting out: circumstances under which
appellate courts may grant relief from state court findings).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(8)(1992) (providing old version of AEDPA). This
section provides in part:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgement
[sic] of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a
factual issue, made by a State court of competentjurisdiction ... shall be
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall
otherwise appear.., that part of the record of the State court proceeding
... is not fairly supported by the record.
Id.
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (2001) (providing current version of AEDPA).
This section provides in part:
[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgement [sic] of a State court shall not be
1208 [Vol. 47: p. 1195
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limited the appellate courts' ability to review and correct capital cases
where necessary.
82
In effect, the AEDPA makes it more difficult for defendants to bring
their capital case before appellate courts, introducing yet another barrier
to properly applying the Batson test.83 The result of the AEDPA on the
ability to challenge capital convictions has had a significant impact on mi-
nority defendants. 84 As the data reveal, all-white juries are more likely to
convict and hand down harsher sentences to minority defendants than
white defendants. 85 Considering the negative implications of these statis-
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim ... resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Id.
82. See Kenneth Williams, The Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA
L. Rxv. 677, 728 (2000) [hereinafter Williams, Deregulation] ("[T]he Supreme
Court and Congress sacrifice fairness, accuracy, and principles, in order to advance
the death penalty.").
Prior to 1996, state court conclusions of law, as well as mixed questions of
law and fact, could be reviewed de novo by a federal court .... [F] ederal
courts are now required to give some deference to state court conclusions
of law ... [and] no longer have the authority to correct erroneous state
court decisions.
Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's Wrong with
It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 926 (2001) [hereinafter Williams,
Antiterrorism].
83. See Williams, Antiterrorism, supra note 82, at 925 (discussing difficulty
AEDPA places upon defendants by making it more difficult to get claims of inno-
cence reviewed).
84. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way
white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials,
perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence."); see also Coke, supra note
21, at 344 (addressing widespread belief among criminal defense counsel that
white juries are more likely to convict than integrated juries).
85. See Goeffrey Cockrell, Note, Batson Reform: A Lottery System of Affirmative
Selection, 11 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 351, 353-54 (1997) (highlighting
paucity of minorities injury pools). Statistics reveal that even when no peremptory
strikes are used, juries tend to be almost entirely devoid of minorities. See id. (not-
ing that minorities are not represented injury pools in accordance with their per-
centage in general community); see also WALKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 157
(outlining how current procedures used to obtain jury pools such as registered
voter lists and property tax rolls tend to produce jury pools that consist primarily of
white, middle and upper class residents);Johnson, supra note 22, at 1616 (attribut-
ing fact that most juries are all white to racial proportions of population). When
prosecutors employ discrimination injury selection, the result is a complete lack of
minorities on the jury. See Cockrell, supra, at 354 ("With a venire already thin on
minorities, few peremptories are needed to eliminate the remaining potential mi-
nority jurors and seat an all-white jury.").
Taking into account the racial makeup of most juries, several studies reveal
that minorities receive disproportionately harsher sentences. One such study, con-
ducted in Philadelphia County, which has the highest number of African-Ameri-
cans on death row, found that African-American defendants' odds of receiving the
15
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tics, as further illustrated by Riley, it is essential that appellate courts re-
ceive the opportunity to review state cases. 8 6
III. ANALYSIS
A. Facts and Procedural Background of Riley
James W. Riley was sentenced to death for a liquor store robbery re-
sulting in the death of the storeowner.8 7 On February 8, 1982, Riley and
two friends stopped at a liquor store with the intent to rob the store. 88
During the robbery, the storeowner resisted and was shot in the leg.89
While the robbers were leaving the store, the storeowner shouted racial
slurs and threw a bottle at them.90 At that point, Riley turned around and
shot the owner, killing him.91 Riley was indicted on numerous grounds
including intentional murder and felony murder, and subsequently sen-
tenced to death.92
death penalty were four times as great as white defendants charged with similar
crimes. See Robert Dunham, Death Penalty and Race: Partners in Injustice, LEGAL IN-
TELLIGENCER, Nov. 30, 2001, at 7 (setting forth study results). Furthermore, studies
conducted in Florida and Georgia found that race of the defendant and race of
the victim were the most significant factor in determining whether the defendant
received the death penalty. SeeJohnson, supra note 22, at 1623 (discussing effect
of defendant's race on imposition of death penalty); see also WALKER ET AL., supra
note 1, at 245 (noting research illustrating that greatest number of death
sentences are imposed when black defendants kill white victims). "African-Ameri-
cans who killed whites faced the greatest odds of a death sentence.... These racial
disparities did not disappear when [the researchers,] Gross and Mauro[,] con-
trolled for other legally relevant predictors of sentence severity." Id. Conversely,
this same research has revealed that minority defendants who kill minority victims
rarely receive the death penalty. See id. (noting that less than 1% of African-Ameri-
can defendants who killed African-Americans were sentenced to death). Mock ju-
ror studies, which ask the participants to determine whether a minority or white
defendant, given identical circumstances, is guilty, have revealed that "[w] hite sub-
jects.., were more likely to find a minority-race defendant guilty than they were to
find an identically situated white defendant guilty." Johnson, supra note 22 at
1626.
86. See Williams, Antiterrorism, supra note 82, at 922-23 (discussing positive ef-
fect of defendant's cases appellate review). Habeas corpus review is responsible for
the reversal of approximately half of all death-sentence cases. See id. (discussing
impact of habeas corpus review). The harm imposed by racially selected jurors to
defendant's right to a fair trial has been replaced by concern with equal protection
rights of jurors. See Cockrell, supra note 85, at 363 (discussing negative effect of
shift of Supreme Court's focus to equal protection rights ofjuror). "The effect of
this shift has been in many instances to reduce the ability of the Batson system to
produce racially mixed juries." Id.






92. See id. at 271 (discussing trial).
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Riley appealed his conviction and sentence on several grounds, most
notably that "the prosecution had exercised its peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory manner . .."91 After several hearings in both state
and federal courts, all of Riley's Batson claims were denied. Eventually, the
Third Circuit granted Riley's petition for a rehearing en banc, found that
Batson was violated and reversed the conviction.
94
B. The Third Circuit's Decision in Riley
1. Neutral Reasons Are Not Supported by the Record
In determining a prima facie case for discriminatory challenges,
courts should look to facts and circumstances particular to each defen-
dant's present case.95 There was no question as to whether a prima facie
case was established here.96 At trial, the state utilized peremptory chal-
lenges to strike all prospective African-American jurors.9 7 The state's ac-
tion resulted in an all-white jury deciding a first-degree murder
prosecution of an African-American defendant for the murder of a white
victim. 98 Having satisfied the prima facie requirement, the court then
turned to the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for striking the three mi-
nority jurors.99 The prosecutor stated that he struck the first juror be-
cause he gave a "significant" pause, indicating uncertainty, when asked
about his ability to return a death sentence; the second juror was struck
because he requested to be excused from jury service because of work; and
the third juror was struck because she testified that she could not impose
the death penalty.10 0 The court accepted the third reason as a valid basis
to strike the juror, but found inconsistencies with the first two reasons.10 1
First, the court questioned whether Nichols, the first juror, had
paused significantly during his testimony, because it was not contained in
the trial transcripts. 10 2 It reasoned that were such a pause as significant as
the prosecutor suggested, then it would certainly have garnered enough
93. See id. at 272 (addressing Riley's Batson claim).
94. See id. at 273 (issuing case holding).
95. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (illustrating requirements
to establish prima facie case).
96. See Riley, 277 F.3d at 276 (noting that there is no contest to fact that defen-
dant established prima facie case).
97. See id. (discussing state voir dire practices).
98. See id. (examining prima facie case establishment).
99. See id. (detailing prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons for striking
potential African-American jurors).
100. See id.
101. See id. at 276-77 (identifying circumstances and evidence that contradict
state's race-neutral reasons).
102. See id. at 279 (observing absence of evidence that juror was struck for
attitude toward death penalty). The court noted that there was no record of the
state's concern in the trial record, in the independent expressions by the court or
in the prosecutor's notes. See id. (noting extent of lack of evidence).
20021 CASEBRIEF 1211
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attention to appear in the transcript.1 0 3 Turning to the trial transcripts,
the court noted the clarity and conciseness of the prospective juror's an-
swers.10 4 The court also noted that there was no "pause" or indication of
hesitation.105
Second, during voir dire, most prospective jurors who expressed an
inability to invoke the death penalty were removed for cause.' 0 6 The
court noted that the prosecutor had not requested that Nichols be re-
moved for cause, throwing further suspicion on whether the "significant
pause" existed.' 0 7
Finally, the court compared the struck juror's answers in the record to
that of another white juror who was subsequently seated on the final
jury.l0 8 The court could find no difference between the two jurors' atti-
tudes based on their answers in the trial record. 10 9 When asked whether
they believed they would be able to impose the death penalty, they both
replied, "I think so."' 10 In Nichols' case, the court performed a thorough
investigation of the record that included comparing the stricken juror's
answers with those of the other seated jurors."' This method helped to
determine whether the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were just a pre-
text for discrimination.1 12
The court used the comparison method again to determine the pros-
ecutor's credibility in his reason for striking the second African-American
103. See id. (noting absence of indication of pause or hesitation in trial
record).
104. See id. (discussing question and answer period during voir dire
procedure).
105. See id. ("[T]he record reflects no such pause and no such uncertainty on
Nichols' part.").
106. See id. (describing removal for cause procedure). During the for cause
proceedings, the court allowed the state to remove six prospective jurors because
the jurors felt they could not impose the death penalty. See id. (describing removal
for cause procedure).
. 107. See id. (noting state's failure to remove juror for cause as it did others
who were unwilling to impose death penalty). Furthermore, the court noted that
"prosecutors did not.., inquire further into his willingness to award the death
penalty," despite their stated misgivings. Id.
108. See id. (discussing similarities between prospective jurors' answers to voir
dire questions).
109. See id. at 279 ("The record provides no basis for distinguishing Nichols
[the black prospective juror] from LePore [the white prospective juror].").
110. See id. (comparing similarities between jurors' answers to voir dire
questions).
111. See id. at 278-80 (describing review of prosecutor's race-neutral explana-
tion to determine whether it was pretext).
112. See id. at 282-83 (discussing need to compare similarly-situated jurors).
"A comparative analysis of jurors struck and those remaining is a well-established
tool for exploring the possibility that facially race-neutral reasons are a pretext for
discrimination." Id. (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir.
1997)).
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juror, McGuire. 113 The court determined that McGuire was as similarly
situated as a white juror who was subsequently seated.' 14 In determining
whether jurors of different races were similarly situated, the court ex-
amined whether the struck juror had the same characteristics as the seated
juror, and whether the prosecutor struck one but not the other.1 15 In this
case, both jurors requested to be relieved ofjury duty, yet only the African-
American juror was stricken.' 1 6
Careful examination of the state's reasoning demonstrates the Third
Circuit's evolution from its original position in Harrison and United States v.
Uwaezhoke. In Harrison and Uwaezhoke, the court set the bar for
prosecutorial reasons relatively low, deeming only the most obvious race-
based reasons unconstitutional. 1 7 Alternatively, in Riley, the Third Circuit
held both the prosecution and the defense counsel to a significantly
higher standard.' 18
2. Trial Court's Failure To Adequately Carry Out the Third Prong of the
Batson Test
Next, the Third Circuit focused its attention on the trial court's analy-
sis of the evidence presented to support or refute the Batson claim." 9 As
previously discussed, the third prong of the Batson test requires the trial
court to rule on the validity of the lawyers challenges based on evidence
obtained from trial and the circumstances of the case. 120 The Supreme
Court did not offer any specific guidance to aid trial courts in their deter-
113. See id. at 282 (examining prosecutor's reason for striking prospective Af-
rican-American juror). The prosecutor stated he struck McGuire because he re-
quested to be excused from jury duty to attend work. See id. (examining
prosecutor's reason for striking prospective African-American juror).
114. See id. at 280 (pointing out lack of distinction between stricken juror and
seated juror who both requested jury relief due to work).
115. See id. at 282-83 (discussing circumstances whenjurors are similarly-
situated).
116. See id. at 280 (observing state's use of peremptory challenges). In its
defense, the state claimed that "McGuire's desire to be excused from jury service
was stronger than Reed's desire because McGuire's employer had intervened to
seek his release ...... Id. The court found, however, that this explanation was
without merit. See id. (rendering validity of state's use of peremptory challenges).
117. See United States v. Uwaezhoke, 141 F.3d 1155 (3d Cir. 1998) (address-
ing low standard for prosecution when setting forth race-neutral decision to strike
prospective jurors); Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1990) (asserting prose-
cutor failed to meet low standard primarily by failing to come up with race-neutral
reason).
118. See Riley, 277 F.3d at 282-83 (applying high standard to find proffered
reasons for peremptory challenges invalid).
119. See id. at 286 (addressing trial court's duty to perform Batson inquiry into
prosecutor's race-neutral reasons). The Third Circuit, upon reviewing the trial
record, will then "decide whether the state courts' acceptance of the State's expla-
nation has been made after consideration of all the evidence on the record." Id. at
279.
120. For further discussion of the third prong of the Batson test, see infra
notes 121-43 and accompanying text.
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mination of fair voir dire procedures, stating that "we make no attempt to
instruct these courts how best to implement our holding today.' 2 1 Conse-
quently, the appellate courts have discretion to rule on whether a trial
courts' methods are sufficiently adequate to satisfy the third prong of the
Batson test.
1 2 2
In Riley, the Third Circuit used this discretion to admonish the trial
court for failing to perform several specific tasks germane to the case that
would aid in determining whether there was an inference of discrimina-
tion. 123 The trial court's shortcomings included its failure to: (1) "coin-
par[e] the stricken black jurors with the sitting white jurors;" (2)
"acknowledg[e] the statistical evidence of striking black jurors with the
sitting white jurors;" and (3) "recognize the State's position ... that use of
peremptoriness for racial reasons was constitutional and socially
beneficial.",124
First, the Third Circuit corrected the trial court for not incorporating
the comparison method into its review of trial circumstances.1 25 The
Third Circuit concluded that comparing prospective jurors in the Riley
case -strongly suggests use by the State of race-based peremptory chal-
lenges."1 26 This conclusion is supported by the fact that several other cir-
cuit courts have found that comparing similarly-situated jurors can
uncover a pretext for discrimination. 127 The Ninth Circuit, for example,
has held that "[a] prosecutor's motives may be revealed as pretextual
where a given explanation is equally applicable to a juror of a different
race who was not stricken by the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 12 8
121. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 99, n. 24 (1986). The Court specifically declined to
specify procedures for courts to follow because of its deference to the variety of
jury venire procedures in state and federal courts. See id. at 99 (explaining limit of
Court's decision).
122. See Williams, Antiterrorism, supra note 82, at 927 (recognizing appellate
court's role in establishing uniformity in applying and complying with federal law).
"[F]ederaljudges are believed to have greater expertise on federal law and there-
fore have the primary responsibility for interpreting that law." Id.
123. See Riley, 277 F.3d at 281-85 (setting forth several elements trial court
overlooked in assessing Batson claim validity).
124. Id. at 286-87.
125., See id. at 282-83 (noting trial court's failure to compare seated jurors with
stricken African-American jurors). The prosecutor claimed that he struck the pro-
spective African-American juror because he requested relief from jury duty. See id.
at 280 (providing similar requests by white jury members). Yet, in his notes, the
prosecutor entered that a white juror that was subsequently seated also wanted
relief. See id. (explaining rationale behind peremptory challenge).
126. Id. at 282.
127. SeeJordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing dis-
criminatory inference gleaned by examining similarly-situated jurors); McClain v.
Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d
912, 921 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).
128. McClain, 217 F.3d at 1220.
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Next, the Third Circuit criticized the trial court's failure to notice the
state's discriminatory pattern of strikes over the course of the year. 129
This pattern revealed that the state had used its peremptory strikes to re-
move every potential African-American juror in the three previous capital
murder cases that year. 130 Furthermore, though the state requested and
was given four weeks to produce evidence to the contrary, it never pro-
duced such evidence.' 3 1 Thus, the Third Circuit drew the conclusion that
such evidence did not exist. 13 2 The Third Circuit imparted upon the trial
court the duty to determine whether discrimination existed based on the
whole of the circumstances, and notjust the sum of its parts.13 3 Imposing
this duty on the trial court illustrates the Third Circuit's devotion to a
thorough Batson inquiry.' 34
Finally, the Third Circuit criticized the trial court for failing to recog-
nize the state's pro-racist position.' 3 5 In this section of the analysis, the
Third Circuit referred to the state's admission of incorporating race into
its peremptory challenges in Riley's previous trials. 13 6 Riley's direct appeal
was tried and ruled upon in 1984, three years before Batson was de-
cided.1 37 During the appellate hearing, Riley objected to the state's use of
its peremptory challenges in a racially-discriminatory manner.'3 8 In re-
129. See id. at 283-84 (outlining court's considering systematic discrimination
evidence).
130. See id. at 280 (reviewing statistical evidence of peremptory strikes exer-
cised against African-American jurors). The court noted that "[i]n these four trials
(including Riley's), the prosecution struck all 8 prospective black jurors who were
called, i.e. 100%. By contrast, the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to
strike only 23 of the 71 prospective white jurors, or 32%." Id.
131. See id. at 278 (noting failure of state to produce evidence rebutting
Riley's systematic discrimination claim). The court further noted that the "State
has never sought to explain the data by variables other than race." Id. at 281.
132. See id. at 283 (analyzing inference drawn from state's failure to provide
promised evidence). "The failure of the State to produce evidence from other
trials is significant because it was the State, not Riley, that would have had access to
such evidence, it was the State that asserted that such evidence was available and
forthcoming, and it was the State, not Riley, that failed to provide it." Id. at 281.
133. See id. at 283 (noting importance of viewing evidence in totality).
134. See id. at 281 (imposing duty on hearing judge to discuss statistics and
"State's failure to explain them[ ]"). The court views the presentation of peremp-
tory challenge practices in past cases as a "significant segment of Riley's evidence."
Id. The hearing judge's failure to consider such evidence was another indication
that he abdicated his duty to perform the third Batson prong. See id. (questioning
state courts' failure to consider evidence).
135. See id. at 286 (questioning state courts' failure to consider state's position
in previous trial).
136. See id. at 284 (referring to state admitting, it struck jurors based on
"group association," then permissible under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965)).
137. See id. (stating date of Riley's direct appeal hearing).
138. See id. (noting that defendant asserted Batson claim).
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sponse, the state could not offer race-neutral reasons in its defense. 139 In
fact, the state claimed that its exclusion of jurors based on their "group
association" was permissible.t 40 Even the Delaware State Supreme Court
acknowledged that "group association" was a recognized euphemism for
race.141 Only in future appeals, after Batson was decided, did the state
produce race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors.1 42 The Third Circuit,
accordingly, refused to credit the state courts' denial of the defendant's
Batson claim, finding that the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were "in-
credible, contradicted, and implausible ... "143
Clearly, the state courts disregarded their duty to perform a thorough
examination as to whether the defendant established a prima facie case
and the validity of the state's proffered race-neutral reasons.1 44 The Third
Circuit court, in reversing Riley's conviction, emphasized the state court's
responsibility to determine the Batson inquiry based on "all the facts and
circumstances." 14 5
C. New AEDPA Standards and Impact on Success of Batson Claims
Fortunately for Riley, the Third Circuit was allowed to review his case
under the old appellate review standard. 146 The old standard held that
the facts in the record must support the findings of the state court.' 47 As
previously shown, the Third Circuit found that the record did not support
the findings of the state court.' 48 Had the Third Circuit's review of Riley's
case occurred under the new AEDPA standard though, the court may have
reached a different result. The new AEDPA standard holds that, in order
to reverse a conviction, the factual findings of the state court must amount
139. See id. ("On ... the State's first opportunity to defend the use of its
peremptory challenges in Riley's trial, the State did not offer a single race-neutral
explanation. ).
140. See id. (observing state's admitted willingness to exercise discriminatory
peremptory challenges based on juror's group associations).
141. See id. (noting that Delaware Supreme Court recognized term as substitu-
tion for race).
142. See id. at 279 (recognizing post conviction hearing as first instance in
which state offered race-neutral reasons).
143. Id. at 285.
144. See id. at 286 (questioning failure of both trial and Delaware Supreme
Court judges in performing prong three of Batson test).
145. See id. (setting forth particulars required for satisfactory execution of
third prong of Batson test).
146. See id. at 278 (examining habeas corpus standard of review applied to
Riley's case).
147. For a summary of the old standard of review, see supra note 79 and ac-
companying text.
148. See Riley, 277 F.3d at 285 (discussing refusal to grant presumption of cor-
rectness to state court's findings because record gave no support). For further
discussion of the inadequacy of state court's holdings, see supra notes 64-80 and
accompanying text.
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to clear error and an unreasonable application to the facts. 149 This
presents a much higher standard of review and limits those cases the cir-
cuit courts may hear and correct.1
5 0
Although the Third Circuit was allowed to review Riley's case to cor-
rect obvious trial and appellate court errors, this may not be the case in
future criminal trials. The AEDPA review standard has come under criti-
cism from commentators because it imposes harsh review standards on
appellate courts. 15 1 For instance, opponents are skeptical that state
courts' review of habeas cases will be thorough enough to dispose of analy-
sis by appellate courts.
1 52
Another common criticism is that, presently, federal courts may re-
view only the most obvious cases of egregious error.153 In fact, propo-
nents of the new standard are of the view that habeas review should only
"remedy extraordinary injustice." 154 The error must be extraordinary in-
deed, because the new standard only allows correction of state holdings
that are botherroneous and unreasonable. 155 In other words, even when
149. See28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (2001) (defining when application for writ of
habeas corpus is permissible).
150. See Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 922 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that
court may not have been allowed to grant relief to defendant had it reviewed the
case under more deferential rules of AEDPA); see also Williams, Antiterrorism, supra
note 82, at 923 (asserting that unstated goal of AEDPA was "to restrain the federal
courts' ability to review death sentences," and effectively "hamperted] death row
inmates' ability to receive a meaningful substantive review of their claims").
151. See Williams, Deregulation, supra note 82, at 692 (2000) (criticizing irra-
tionality of requiring federal courts to defer to state courts "despite the fact that
the writ of habeas corpus exists to correct unconstitutional state convictions[ ]").
For further discussion of criticisms of AEDPA, see supra notes 144-51 and accompa-
nying text, and infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
152. See Williams, Antiterrorism, supra note 82, at 927-28 (describing many
states' review of habeas claims as "perfunctory" and superficial); Williams, Deregula-
tion, supra note 82, at 682-83 (discussing primary reason defendants are unlikely to
prevail on direct appeal). The author notes several reasons state appeals are often
ineffective including incompetent counsel for appeal, frequent use of harmless
error doctrine and state judge's elected position. See Williams, Deregulation, supra
note 82, at 682-83 (explaining causes of defendants losing on direct appeal).
153. See Williams, Deregulation, supra note 82, at 690-95 (illustrating several
ways AEDPA restricts defendant's ability to bring habeas petitions in front of court,
which effectively guarantees that only exceptional cases will be heard by appellate
courts). The restrictions AEDPA imposes on defendants include narrow time lim-
its on filing of habeas petition, enhanced deference to state court findings and
limited appellate review of findings of district courts. See id. (overviewing AEDPA
restrictions).
154. Williams, Antiterrorism, supra note 82, at 927. Proponents of the new
AEDPA standard also argue that reversal of state holdings "undermines the crimi-
nal justice system." See Williams, Deregulation, supra note 82, at 685-86 (criticizing
liberal use of writs of habeas corpus to vacate federal criminal prosecutions).
155. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (emphasizing importance of state court's holding being both incorrect and
unreasonable). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because
that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court de-
cision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,
23
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the state court makes an obvious error, the holding will be allowed to
stand.1 56 This standard has prompted defendants and appellate courts to
begin focusing their attention on establishing elements of unreasonable-
ness of the state court holdings. 157 Currently, however, the AEDPA stan-
dard only prohibits correction of such error in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Batson gave rise to a period of change in criminal jury selec-
tion, it has since been narrowed by procedural and legislative restraints.
1 5 8
The goals Batson has purported to accomplish, primarily to assure defend-
ants and the community that criminal judgments are not tainted by invidi-
ous discrimination, are commendable. 159 Unfortunately, due to the many
restrictions imposed on equal protection cases dealing with race, many
defendants continue to slip through the cracks, and contribute to the sta-
tistics that support the inference that race still matters in America's judi-
cial system. 160
Batson's most profound restriction, also receiving the most criticism, is
that only where there is a blatant racial inference is the standard allowed
to accomplish its goals. 161 Additionally, it is difficult for Batson to have any
impact when trial and review courts do not correctly perform the third
prong of the Batson test.162 Finally, the new AEDPA standards make it
that application must also be unreasonable." Id.; see also Williams, Antiterrorism,
supra note 82, at 926 (describing unreasonableness requirement utilized to provide
"finality of state court criminal convictions[ ]").
156. See Williams, Deregulation, supra note 82, at 691 (expressing that standard
tolerates unconstitutional convictions). The author expresses concern that "the
very courts that may have unconstitutionally convicted and sentenced an inmate
are now given great deference ...." Id. But see Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling
Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J.
1427, 1428 (2001) (recognizing circuit split regarding standard of review for
mixed questions of law and fact). While the Seventh Circuit applies a de novo
standard of review, the Ninth Circuit has determined that the question should be
viewed with a view toward deference to the state court's finding. See id. (explaining
differing review standards).
157. See Williams, Deregulation, supra note 82, at 682 (discussing work of death
row inmate advocates). Attorneys from such organizations as NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union offer "bril-
liant, dedicated representation" in order to gain habeas review. See id. (discussing
work of death row inmate advocates).
158. For a discussion of Batson's limitations, see supra notes 40-86 and accom-
panying text.
159. For a discussion of Batson's policy goals, see supra note 39 and accompa-
nying text.
160. For a discussion of disparate conviction rates and sentencing of minority
defendants by white jurors, see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of Batson's propensity to allow race-neutral challenges
that are subtly racial in nature to stand, see supra notes 43-64 and accompanying
text.
162. For a discussion of trial courts' failure to adequately perform Batson's
third prong, see supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
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even more difficult for appellate courts to review and correct Batson viola-
tions in capital cases.
1 63
In its past dealings with Batson claims, the Third Circuit, like many
others, fell victim to these limitations. 164 The court's most recent decision
in Riley, however, effectively overcomes the systematic limits common to all
Batson inquiries. 165 Although the state's neutral reasons for striking the
African-American jurors were plausible, the court refused to accept them
at face value. 166 The court instead performed a thorough examination of
the reasons, as required by the third prong of the Batson test.16 7 Had the
court been required to review the case under the new AEDPA standards,
however, its decision may have turned out differently.1 68 As it stood, the
court was only required to find a lack of support in the evidence, a defi-
ciency that was firmly established in the trial record. 169 In the Riley case,
the Third Circuit provided a prime example of how courts should apply
the Batson test to ensure fair trials for defendants.
Oluseyi Olubadewo
163. For a discussion of negative impact of AEDPA review standards on suc-
cess of Batson claims, see supra notes 79-86 and 150-58 and accompanying text.
164. See United States v. Clemmons, 92 F.2d 1153, 1159 (3d Cir. 1989) (Hig-
ginbotham, J., concurring) (highlighting trend of Third Circuit cases to allow per-
emptory challenges that may be racially motivated).
165. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Riley v. Taylor, see supra
notes 95-158 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the state's proffered race-neutral reasons in Riley, see
supra notes 95-119 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of Third Circuit analysis of Batson's third prong, see
supra notes 120-46 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of the requirements and effect of new AEDPA stan-
dards, see supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
169. SeeRileyv. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 285 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing refusal to
grant presumption of correctness to state court's findings because record gave no
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